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CASENOTE
M.L.B. V. S.L.J.: "EQUAL JUSTICE" FOR INDIGENT
PARENTS
Any and every child born into the world deserves all the
dignity and respect there is-in short love, which is not a
privilege, but a natural right.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently decided that a
state may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals
from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the
affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.' In
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,2 the Supreme Court found that, just as a
state may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an
appeal afforded others,3 Mississippi may not deny M.L.B., be-
cause of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a
parent.4
This decision comes from a line of cases in which the Su-
preme Court has struggled with the question of what process is
due in non-criminal proceedings and how indigents are affected
* Keorapetse Kgositsile, The Impulse Is Simple NEGRO DIG., July 1968, re-
printed in MY SOUL LOOKS BACK, 'LEss I FORGET 55 (Dorothy W. Riley ed., 1993).
1. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
2. Id.
3. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971).
4. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
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by such process. Indigent litigants are problematic because
their particular disadvantages may require the removal of pro-
cedural obstacles, such as the payment or waiver of transcript
costs or docket fees, that may block access to appellate review.5
In criminal proceedings, states must provide an indigent de-
fendant with a transcript of prior proceedings when that tran-
script is needed for an effective defense or appeal.' This princi-
ple of "equal justice"7 secures transcripts for appeals of habeas
corpus hearings,8 transcripts of preliminary hearings to prepare
5. See generally id. at 561 n.4 (noting various procedural obstacles that were
removed).
6. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); see also Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). These cases involved a
direct appeal from a trial court decision. The rationale used in deciding these cases
was that the appellant would have serious disadvantages in overcoming the presump-
tion that his trial was free of prejudicial error. For example, it would be very dif-
ficult to prove possible mistakes without a record of the prior proceeding. Note that
the Court in each of these cases emphasized the idea that substitutes used in place
of the transcript may be sufficient. Possible substitutes included statements of the
facts agreed to by both parties or a full narrative statement prepared from the
judge's minutes. See, e.g., M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561-62 n.5 (citing possible substi-
tutes).
7. According to this principle, states are not required to establish a system for
criminal appeals. However, once a state establishes such a system, it must not unrea-
sonably distinguish litigants in a manner that will impede equal access to the courts.
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) ("This Court has never held
that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now
fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned
distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."). For tran-
script cases, see Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S.
367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison
Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Ross v. Schreckloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and People v. Montgomery, 224 N.E.2d 730
(1966). For docket fee cases, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 252 (1961), and Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). See generally
Note, Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REV. 25
(1973); Note, In Forma Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Ac-
tions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (1985); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to
the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516 (1968).
8. See Long, 385 U.S. at 195. In habeas corpus appeals, the appellant has to
overcome the just imprisonment presumption. The appellant must prove specific errors
to free himself. Also, in habeas corpus appeals more time has generally elapsed be-
tween a trial and a post-conviction hearing than in the situation of a trial followed
by a direct appeal. Thus, it is even more difficult to proceed without a record. In
Long, the Court diminished the alternative principle saying it need not consider pos-
sible situations where transcripts cannot reasonably be made available by the state.
See id. at 195. However, this was a per curiam opinion and may best be understood
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for criminal trials,9 trial transcripts for appeals of petty offens-
es, 10 and trial transcripts for non-felony appeals."
In termination of parental rights cases, 2 the Supreme Court
has held that indigent parents do not have a per se right to
state-appointed counsel and has endorsed a case-by-case ap-
proach in making this determination. 3 However, the Court in
M.L.B. held that under the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause, a state may not terminate a parental right
and then deny the parent appellate review of the sufficiency of
the evidence because of her poverty. 4
In a decree terminating petitioner M.L.B.'s parental rights to
her two children, a Mississippi Chancery Court cited the gov-
erning Mississippi statute and stated that respondents, the
children's natural father and his second wife, had met their
burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence.""5 M.L.B.
as applied to the specific facts of the case.
9. See Roberts, 389 U.S. at 42-43 (ignoring the idea of alternatives to a tran-
script in the direct review of the preliminary hearing); see also Gardner, 393 U.S. at
370-71 (finding that the conduct and decision of the first proceeding was very impor-
tant to a de novo post-conviction hearing). But see Britt, where the Court found no
right to a free transcript of a mistrial in an entirely new trial. See 404 U.S. at 230.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant is still presumed
innocent and nothing from the first hearing is binding on the subsequent proceeding,
that is, the subsequent proceeding is independent of the first proceeding. See Britt v.
North Carolina, 174 S.E.2d 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970), affd 404 U.S. 226 (1971). How-
ever, because there were alternatives available, the United States Supreme Court did
not find on any of these grounds. See Britt, 404 U.S. at 230.
10. See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459 (1969).
11. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). This case reversed the trend of
ignoring alternatives to transcripts. See E. Graham McGoogan, Jr., Criminal Proce-
dure-Free Transcripts for Indigents, 51 N.C. L. REv. 621, 622 (1973).
12. Termination of parental rights proceedings have been recognized as among the
most severe forms of action a state can take. See Note, The Right to Family Integrity:
A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings,
68 GEo. L.J. 213, 230 (1978).
13. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34-35 (1981); cf Davis
v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that where prolonged or indefinite
deprivation of parental custody is threatened, due process requires that the indigent
parent be offered counsel and that counsel be provided unless a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver is made).
14. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 559 (1996).
15. See id. at 559-60. Clear and convincing evidence is defined in a number of
ways. For example, "to establish a fact or an element by clear and convincing evi-
dence a party must persuade the jury that the proposition is highly probable or must
produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations
in question are true." 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 157 (1994) (citations omitted).
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filed a timely appeal, but Mississippi law conditioned her right
to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees. 6 Lacking
funds to pay the fees, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. 7 The Supreme Court of Mississippi found no right to
proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals and denied her appli-
cation."
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, first established
that a line of precedent exists recognizing the principle of
"equal justice---a doctrine created by the convergence of due
process and equal protection concerns. 9 This principle of
"equal justice" applies to both civil and criminal proceedings
and is relevant when considering problems indigents may have
accessing courts. ° Though the waiving of court fees in civil
cases is the exception rather than the rule, the Court noted
that it has consistently set apart cases involving state controls
or intrusions on family relationships from ordinary civil cas-
es. 21 Since parental status termination is "irretrievably de-
structive" of the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in
having a relationship with her child and the risk of error is
considerable, these cases are treated like cases that are crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal in nature.22 Accordingly, access to judicial
processes may not turn on the ability to pay,' and in this
case, Mississippi may not withhold the transcript that M.L.B.
needed for her appeal.24
This Note will analyze how the facts of M.L.B. required the
Court to merge a fundamental right recognized under the Due
Process Clause with an equal protection analysis to determine
the rights of an indigent parent in parental rights termination
proceedings. It will look briefly at the evolution of the right of
access to judicial proceedings for indigents in order to illustrate
16. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
17. See id.; see also infra note 86 (discussing "in forma pauperis").
18. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct., at 560 (citation omitted).
19. See id.; see also discussion supra note 7.
20. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560-64.
21. See id. at 563-64.
22. See id. at 566-68.
23. See id. at 568.
24. See id. at 578. The transcripted was "needed" because the Mississippi statute
required appellants in these cases to order them for the appeal. See sources cited
infra notes 84 and 86.
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the significance of this decision. This Note will delineate how
the result reached by the Court is a natural extension of prior
transcripts cases when viewed in terms of the interests in-
volved. Finally, it will examine the implications of M.L.B. on
future indigent civil litigants.
II. THE GRIFFIN PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL JUSTICE
A. Griffin v. Illinois
The landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois25 involved an Illinois
rule that conditioned appeals from criminal convictions on the
defendant's obtaining a transcript of trial proceedings.26 Indi-
gent defendants, other than those sentenced to death, were not
excepted from the rule, and in most cases defendants without
means to pay for a transcript did not have access to any appel-
late review.
Justice Black, writing the plurality opinion in Griffin, held
that the state has to provide a criminal defendant with a steno-
graphic transcript of the criminal trial when it is necessary to
his appealY A state is not required to provide the criminal
defendant with an opportunity to appeal. But once the state
has established an appellate system of review, it must grant
access to that system ensuring the fair treatment of all individ-
uals seeking such review.29 The state cannot provide these
transcripts to only a select class of defendants or, only to those
who offer to pay for them. °
Though resting mostly on an equal protection analysis, the
Court explained that the "equal justice" principle is actually
supported by both due process and equal protection concerns.
25. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
26. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-14 & nn.2-3).
27. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 14.
28. See id. at 19-20.
29. See id. at 18.
30. Griffin was the first time the Court used an equal protection analysis to
require the government to provide a guaranteed minimum form of fairness to all
criminal defendants, regardless of whether the claim related to a right with specific
recognition in the first eight amendments. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUN-
DA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.41, at 943 (5th ed. 1995).
19981 575
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When taken together, these constitutional clauses "emphasize
the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged
with a crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court.""'
Denying a criminal defendant a transcript because of his inabil-
ity to pay for it, in a state where such a transcript is necessary
to appeal, means only those who can afford the transcript can
appeal their convictions. The Court declared that if a state
found it important to correct adjudications of guilt or innocence
through appellate review, poor people should not lose "life,
liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate
courts would set aside," 2 merely because they cannot afford
the appeal. The effect works an invidious discrimination against
indigents and thus, is invalid."3
31. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940)). The dissent argued that the Illinois law should be upheld since, by its terms,
it applied to rich and poor alike. See id. at 30-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But a law
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. For
example, the Supreme Court struck down the so-called "grandfather clause" of the
Oklahoma Constitution as discriminatory against African-Americans although that
clause was nondiscriminatory on its face. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1984); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939).
32. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
33. Litigation expenses are required of both the rich and the poor. Thus, tech-
nically there is no overt discrimination against those who are not wealthy. The con-
cern is with the disproportionate impact of the requirement of payment on the poor.
See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 349 n.81 (1990).
The Griffin Court's reasoning seems to contradict its later holdings regarding
the effect of disproportionate impact on equal protection analysis. In later cases, dis-
proportionate effect, standing alone, was not enough to trigger heightened equal pro-
tection review, even in the context of race. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977) (noting that disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the only test of racial discrimination, and,
standing alone, does not qualify the impact of strictest scrutiny); Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact alone does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment). In fact, these cases do not forbid discrimination
by the government; they seem to require it by giving preferential treatment to
indigents. The idea that the Court was requiring discrimination by giving such prefer-
ential treatment to indigents concerned Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Griffin. See 351 U.S. at 34-35. This apparent discrepancy seems to have been over-
looked by the Court in M.L.B. Justice Thomas, in his dissent, clearly recognized this
contradiction. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The importance of appellate review to the correct adjudication of guilt or inno-
cence was also noted. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
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According to the Court, the appellant must receive "as ade-
quate review" as other, more affluent appellants.34 The state
does not have to equalize economic conditions.35 Nonetheless,
when a state allows for appeals of convictions, "it cannot by
force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted
indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing
such a review .... .6
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, noted that the Court ought
solely to use a due process analysis in which it considers the
"fundamental fairness" of the law.17 Otherwise, the floodgates
of litigation will open because an equal protection claim could
be brought for any sort of wealth discrimination assertion. Jus-
tice Harlan's concerns were later recognized and the Court had,
until M.L.B., shifted its reliance from equal protection almost
completely to due process.38
B. Griffin Extended: Mayer v. Chicago
Griffin's progeny further establish that a state cannot arbi-
trarily cut off appellate rights for indigents while leaving open
34. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19-20.
35. See id at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 38 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Judicial determination of what is funda-
mental fairness has evoked strong criticism from those who have favored the incorpo-
ration theory of the Bill of Rights. This theory was adopted by Justice Reed in Ad-
amson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 47 (1947). For Justice Reed, the issue in Adamson
was whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as applied
against the state by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted
the court and counsel to comment on the failure of a defendant to explain or deny
evidence against him, and whether this failure may be considered by court and jury.
See id. The majority looked at the state practice in terms of its overall fairness or,
as Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion stated, "[whether such practice] offends
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples ... ." Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This "natural law"
theory later evolved into Justice Harlan's fundamental fairness test. For Justice
Harlan, due process is a test of "fundamental fairness"; the inquiry in each case must
be "whether a state trial process was a fair one." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
187 (1968). This inquiry requires a case by case evaluation of state procedures. See
Michael KMimpl, Indigent's Access to Civil Court, 4 COLUM. HUm. RTS. L. REv., 267,
270-71 n.20 (1972).
M.L.B. involved the relationship between a parent and a child. This was held
to be a fundamental liberty interest. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568.
38. See Medine, supra note 33, at 299-300.
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avenues of appeal for more affluent persons." While typically
such fee requirements are examined only for rationality, there
are exceptions made by the Court for particular situations.
In Mayer v. City of Chicago40 the Court explained that
Griffin's principle is not confined to cases in which imprison-
ment is at stake. Mayer dealt with an indigent who had alleg-
edly committed a petty offense. He was convicted of two misde-
meanors and sentenced to pay $250 for each offense. The Court
held that criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings would be ex-
cepted from the general rule that fee requirements are exam-
ined only for rationality.4  The Court held that felony-
nonfelony distinctions are "unreasoned" and "impermissible" as
a means of impeding indigents' access to the courts." Accord-
ing to the Court, the Griffin principle "is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal
as would be available to others able to pay their own way."43
39. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 458-59 (1969) (per curiam)
(holding that transcript needed to perfect appeal must be furnished at state expense
to indigent defendant sentenced to 90 days in jail and a $50 fine for drunk driving);
Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 192-94 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that tran-
script must be furnished at state expense to enable indigent state habeas corpus peti-
tioner to appeal denial of relief); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708-09 (1961) (hold-
ing that filing fee to process state habeas corpus application must be waived for indi-
gent prisoner); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253, 257-58 (1959) (holding that filing
fee for motion for leave to appeal from judgment of intermediate appellate court to
state supreme court must be waived when defendant is indigent).
40. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
41. See id. at 196-97.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 196-97. In M.L.B., Justice Ginsburg stated, 'ihn accord with the sub-
stance and sense of our decisions in Lassiter and Santosky, we place decrees forever
terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt
the door on equal justice.' M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 568 (1996) (internal cita-
tion omitted). In the same paragraph she noted two exceptions: (1) the basic right to
participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those
who can pay for a license, and (2) access to judicial processes in cases criminal or
quasi-criminal in nature may not turn on the ability to pay. See id. Justice Ginsburg
has included parental status termination cases among those that are criminal or
quasi-criminal in nature.
However, M.L.B. could conceivably be more limited than originally thought.
After all, the study used in support of Justice Ginsburg's argument that such an
imposition will not be a heavy burden on Mississippi, dealt only with Mississippi's
parental rights termination decrees. Now that there is a greater opportunity to ap-
peal these decrees in every state, those states that had greater burdens than Missis-
sippi at the time of this decision may now have to sustain an even greater burden
than they had before.
M.L.B. V. S.L.J.
IIl. GRIFFIN PRINCIPLE LIMTED TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
CIviL CONTEXTS: BODDIE AND ITS PROGENY
In Boddie v. Connecticut," appellants, representing a class
of welfare recipients, asked a district court to declare a state
procedure requiring the payment of process45 and court fees'
for commencement of a divorce action unconstitutional as a
violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The practical effect of
the Connecticut law was to deny indigents who could not pay
these costs access to the courts.4 The district court held that
the fee requirements did not deny appellants a fundamental
right, and neither equal protection nor due process was forsak-
en.48 On appeal, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, re-
versed the district court decision. For Justice Harlan, the issue
was clearly one of due process, not equal protection. The exis-
tence of a court fee was simply and fundamentally unfair to an
indigent seeking a divorce.49
The Court found that the right involved was access to the
courts for the resolution of conflicts in the marital relation-
ship-marriage consistently being held as an interest of basic
importance in our society." Because the state had a monopoly
on the dissolution of marriage, private parties were totally
dependent on a state's legal system for divorce actions. Thus,
due process prohibits a state from denying individuals seeking
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), established that if
M.L.B.'s defense was sufficiently complex, she would have been designated state-paid
counsel. According to Justice Ginsburg, it would be anomalous to hold that M.L.B.
could be eligible for state-paid counsel but should be flatly denied a transcript while
also holding that one has a right to a transcript when appealing a misdemeanor,
although that person may be flatly denied trial counsel regardless of the complexity
of the misdemeanor defense. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567.
44. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
45. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-261 (West 1958).
46. See id. § 52-259(c).
47. See Klimpl, supra note 37.
48. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372-74.
49. See id. at 381.
50. See id. at 376 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). In Boddie,
Justice Harlan cited these cases for the proposition that marriage has been held to
be a fundamental right. See id.
1998] 579
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judicial resolution of their marriage access to its courts solely
because of their inability to pay.5'
Boddie established that where a fundamental interest is
involved in a civil proceeding and the state has a monopoly on
the means of dissolving that relationship, due process prohibits
a state from denying access to its courts by requiring the pay-
ment of fees.52 Boddie extended the Griffin principle to civil
proceedings in which a fundamental liberty interest is at
stake.5"
Later cases, such as United States v. Kras4 and Ortwein v.
Schwab,5" show the Court's reluctance to extend the Griffin
principle to civil cases devoid of a fundamental liberty interest.
Thus, cases involving state control or intrusions on family rela-
tionships are generally set apart from "the mine run of civil
cases."
56
51. See id. at 375; see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1981) (holding
that a state must pay for blood grouping tests sought by an indigent defendant to
enable him to contest a paternity suit).
52. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382-83.
53. In Boddie, the fundamental liberty interest was marriage and divorce. See id.
54. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Justice Ginsburg cites Kras in M.L.B. because the case
states the general rule that "a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil
cases is the exception ..... " M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 563 (1996). Kras con-
cerned fees, totaling $50, required to secure a discharge in bankruptcy. The Court
held that bankruptcy discharge entails no fundamental interest. See Kras, 409 U.S. at
445. Such an interest "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the interest
in establishing or dissolving a marriage as in Boddie; nor is resort to court the sole
path to securing debt forgiveness as marriage termination requires access to the
state's courts. Id.
55. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam). The appellants in Ortwein sought court re-
view of agency determinations reducing their welfare benefits. See id. at 656. Alleging
poverty, they challenged an Oregon statute requiring appellants in civil cases to pay
a $25 fee. See id. at 658. The Court followed Kras because there was no fundamental
interest gained or lost depending on the availability of the relief sought by the com-
plainants. See id. at 659. Absent a fundamental interest or classification attracting
heightened scrutiny, the applicable equal protection standard is that of rational justi-
fication, a requirement satisfied by Oregon's need for revenue to offset the expenses
of its court system. See id. at 660. In M.L.B., Justice Ginsburg used Ortwein and
Kras to show that the Court did not extend Griffin to apply in a broad array of civil
cases. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 563.
56. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 556.
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IV. PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE LIBERTY INTERESTS: DUE PROCESS
ANALYSES OF LASSITER AND SANTOSKY
Due process evolution in the area of parental rights began in
1972, when the Supreme Court recognized the essential right to
conceive and raise one's children." In determining what proce-
dures are required by due process, the Court has considered
three factors: (1) the importance of the individual liberty at
stake; (2) the extent to which the requested procedure may
reduce the possibility of erroneous decision making; and (3) the
governmental interest in avoiding the increased administrative
and fiscal burdens that result from increased procedural re-
quirements.58
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services," the Court ad-
dressed the issue of an indigent's right to appointed counsel in
a state-initiated proceeding for termination of parental rights.
The Court balanced the three due process considerations enun-
ciated in Matthews v. Eldridge° against a presumption that
the right to appointment of counsel is contingent upon impris-
onment.6 Though the Court did not find a per se right to ap-
57. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). "The importance of the parent-
child relationship is such that the Court will strictly scrutinize the fairness of pro-
cedures used to establish or terminate that relationship." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 30, § 13.8, at 556 (footnote omitted).
58. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Matthews involved a person
whose social security disability benefits had been terminated. An action was brought
challenging the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. The
United States Supreme Court held that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior
to termination of disability benefits and that the procedures promulgated by the Sec-
retary did comport with due process. See id. at 324-25, 349.
The difficulty of predicting how the Supreme Court will employ the Matthews
balancing test is evident in its rulings in parental rights cases. See NOWAK & ROTUN-
DA, supra note 30, § 13.8, at 556.
59. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
60. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
61. See Lassiter, 452 U.S at 18. The Court's method actually involved a two-step
process. Initially, the three civil due process considerations-the litigant's interests,
the need for procedural safeguards, and the state's interest-were weighed and bal-
anced. See id& at 27-30. The result was then balanced against the presumption that
imprisonment is required to invoke a right to appointed counsel. 8ee id. at 31. The
Court concluded that Ms. Lassiter's interests were insufficient to overcome the com-
bined weight of the State's interests and the presumption that imprisonment is a
prerequisite to appointment of counsel. See id. at 32-33. Because the parent's inter-
ests may sometimes outweigh this combination, the decision to appoint counsel was to
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pointed counsel in this case, it did find the parent's interest in
the accuracy and justice of the decision to be a commanding
one.12 Because the object of such a proceeding is to end the
parent's fundamental liberty interest in a relationship with her
child, a decision against a parent "works a unique kind of de-
privation."' Even though the state is not a party to the pro-
ceeding, the result is the same because the state is terminating
the rights of a parent. The Court recognized that the trial court
must decide whether the indigent should receive counsel on a
case by case basis, subject to appellate review."
Due process evolution in the area of parental rights culminat-
ed in Santosky v. Kramer,65 where the Court held that the due
process rights of parents require petitioners to prove the
grounds for termination by "clear and convincing evidence."'
This standard is appropriate when the individual interests at
stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly important"
and "more substantial than mere loss of money." 7 The Court
went on to apply the Matthews balancing tests and deter-
mined that the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard
in such cases is inconsistent with due process.69 The Court
found that "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must
be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he
be made on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 32; see also Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Note,
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent
Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 261, 264 & n.20 (1982); see generally Colene
Flynn, In Search of Greater Procedural Justice: Rethinking Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 327 (1996).
62. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 565 (1996) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at
27).
63. Id. (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
64. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
65. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the parents appealed a judgment of a fami-
ly court, which found their children to be permanently neglected. See id. at 751-52.
The Supreme Court held that before a state may sever completely and irrevocably the
rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state support
its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 769-70. This is be-
cause natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of their child. See id. at 753.
66. See id. at 767-68. This standard is an intermediate standard of review. See
supra note 15; see also Gary R. Govert, Termination of Parental Rights: Putting Love
in its Place, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1177, 1183-89 (1985).
67. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
68. See case and source cited supra note 58.
69. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758.
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may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss."'0 Thus, since the
loss of parental rights to one's child is severe, and that loss is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment," a heightened "clear and convincing evidence"
standard is appropriate.
Lassiter and Santosky, despite their divided opinions, unani-
mously held that "the interest of parents in their relationship
with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within
the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 This fundamental liberty interest of a natural
parent in a relationship with her child is what was at issue in
M.L.B.73
V. M.L.B.: A CONVERGENCE OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION TO AFFORD "EQUAL JUSTICE"
A. The Majority Opinion
M.L.B. and S.L.J. are, respectively, the biological mother and
father of two children. 4 After they divorced, the children re-
mained in the father's custody, as agreed to by both parties. 5
S.L.J. remarried and filed suit in a Chancery Court of Missis-
sippi, seeking to terminate the parental rights of M.L.B. and to
gain approval for adoption of the children by their stepmoth-
er.
76
After hearing evidence, the Chancellor terminated all the
parental rights of M.L.B., approved the adoption, and ordered
the adopting parent to be shown as the mother on the
children's birth certificates. 7 The Chancery Court cited the
governing Mississippi statute8 and found that there had been
70. Id. at 758 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (citation
omitted)).
71. See id. at 753 (citations omitted).
72. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 565 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774).
73. See discussion infra note 107 and accompanying text.




78. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(e) (1994). This statute sets forth several
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a "substantial erosion of the relationship between the natural
mother, [M.L.B.], and the minor children, which had been
caused at least in part by [M.L.B.'s] serious neglect, abuse,
prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreasonable failure to
visit or communicate with her minor children."79 The Chancel-
lor stated that the natural father and his second wife had met
their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence." How-
ever, the Chancellor did not describe the evidence nor reveal
precisely why M.L.B.'s parental rights were terminated.8
M.L.B. filed a timely appeal and paid the $100 filing fee. 2 The
Clerk of the Chancery Court estimated the costs for preparing
and transmitting the record to be over $2,300.83
Mississippi granted civil litigants a right to appeal, but condi-
tions that right on prepayment of costs." "Relevant portions of
a transcript [had to] be ordered, and its preparation costs ad-
vanced by the appellant."5 M.L.B. was unable to pay these
costs, so "she sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis."5 The
Mississippi Supreme Court denied her application relying on its
grounds for termination of parental rights, including, "when there is [a] substantial
erosion of the relationship between the parent and child which was caused at least in
part by the parent's serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, un-
reasonable failure to visit or communicate, or prolonged imprisonment." M.L.B., 117
S. Ct. at 559 n.1.
79. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 9-10).
80. See id. at 559-60 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 10).
81. See id. at 560.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.; see also MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-51-3, 11-51-29 (1995 & Cum. Supp.
1997).
85. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-29 (1995 & Cure.
Supp. 1997); Mss. R. OF APp. P. 10(b)(2).
86. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560. In forma pauperis "describes [the] permission given
to a poor person (i.e. indigent) to proceed without liability for court fees or costs. An
indigent will not be deprived of his rights to litigate and appeal; if the court is satis-
fied as to his indigency, he may proceed without incurring costs or fees of court."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990); see also FED. R. APP. P. 24; Kenneth R.
Levine, In Forma Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 1461, 1462 n.6 (1985); see generally Ronald A. Case, Annotation,
Determination of Indigency of Accused Entitling Him To Transcript or Similar Record
For Purposes of Appeal, 66 A.L.R. 3d 954 (1976); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation,
What Constitutes "Fees" or 'Costs" Within Meaning of Federal Statutory Provision
(Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(A) and Similar Predecessor Statutes) Permitting Party to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or Security
Therefor, 20 A.L.R. FED. 274 (1974).
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precedent that allowed the right to proceed in forma pauperis
in civil cases only at the trial level.8"
Before analyzing M.L.B.'s claim that a state may not condi-
tion appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental
rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation
fees, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, said this was
an issue of "equal justice."88 She cited Griffin as establishing
the "equal justice" principle,89 supported by both the Due Pro-
cess Clause and Equal Protection Clause." According to the
Court in Griffin, states are not required to establish a system
for criminal appeals. 1 However, under the "equal justice" prin-
ciple, once a system is established, the state cannot unreason-
ably distinguish litigants in a manner that will impede equal
access to the courts.92 She then found the principle to be a
"'flat prohibition 'against' making access to appellate process-
es... depend upon the [convicted] defendant's ability to
pay."
93
Turning to a civil analysis of due process, Justice Ginsburg
recognized a narrow category of cases in which the state must
provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a
party's ability to pay court fees. Relying on Boddie, she ex-
plained that because marriage is a fundamental interest and
the State has a monopoly on the means for dissolving it, "due
process 'prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely because of in-
87. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 3). Mississippi, by
statute, provides for coverage of transcript fees and other costs for indigents in civil
commitment appeals. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-83 (1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997)
("The record on appeal shall include the transcript of commitment hearing."); id. § 41-
21-85 (1993) ("All costs of hearing or appeal ... shall be borne by the [state board
of mental health] where the patient is indigent ...
88. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
89. See supra text accompanying note 7.
90. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561.
91. See id. at 560 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956)).
92. See id. at 560-61.
93. Id. at 561 (citing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971)). These justi-
fications demonstrate the seemingly dominant equal protection concerns of the Griffin
principle. The Court eventually analyzed the fundamental liberty interest of due pro-
cess, established by Lassiter and Santosky, under the predominantly equal protection
framework of Griffin and Mayer. See infra note 99. The application of the "equal
justice" principle began in Griffin, a criminal case, and has been subsequently used in
both Lassiter and M.L.B., civil cases.
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ability to pay, access to its courts .... ..4 Application of the
Griffin principle then is limited to civil litigation where a fun-
damental liberty interest like marriage is at stake. Later cases,
such as Kras and Schwab, demonstrate the Court's reluctance
to extend the Griffin principle to civil cases devoid of such a
liberty interest.95 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court has
consistently set apart cases involving state controls or intru-
sions on family relationships from the "mine run of civil cas-
es."
96
Justice Ginsburg cited Lassiter and Santosky as holding the
parent-child relationship to be a commanding, fundamental
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause." She went on
to explain how due process and equal protection concerns con-
verge to protect indigent litigants with such fundamental inter-
ests at stake.98 The equal protection concern relates to the le-
94. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562.
95. See cases cited supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. In Ortwein, the
Court upheld a system imposing $25 filing fees for appellate review of welfare eligi-
bility determinations. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. at 656, 656 (1973) (per curl-
am). This effectively precluded indigent welfare recipients from receiving judicial re-
view of the termination of this benefit. Due process requires only a fair initial hear-
ing. Because there was no constitutional right to welfare payments, the state could
impose such filing fees on all persons. See id. at 659-60.
96. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 563-64. The governmental interest asserted in defense of
the intrusion shall therefore be "examined closely and contextually." Id.
97. See id. at 565-66; see also supra notes 61 and 65. Santosky established a
standard of "clear and convincing evidence" for parental right termination proceedings.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767-68 (1982).
98. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566; see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983) (holding that a sentencing court could not properly revoke a defendant's proba-
tion for failure to pay a fine and make restitution absent evidence and findings that
he was somehow responsible for the failure and that alternative forms of punishment
would be inadequate to meet Georgia's interest in punishment and deterrence); Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that a rule requiring appointment of counsel
for indigent state defendants on their first appeal as of right would not be extended
to require counsel for discretionary state appeals and for application for review in the
Supreme Court, such appointment not being required by due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Justice Ginsburg relied on Ross and Bearden in her explanation of how due
process and equal protection concerns converge when considering access to judicial
processes.
The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out
would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs ....
The due process concern hones in on the essential fairness of the state-
ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action .... A "precise
rationale" has not been composed, ... because cases of this order "can-
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gitimacy of keeping appellants out of court based solely on their
inability to pay.99 The due process concern relates to the es-
sential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings that follow
adverse state action."o Because due process does not indepen-
dently require the state to provide a right to appeal, most deci-
sions rest on an equal protection framework.'' Thus,
"M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever perma-
nently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the
not be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeon hole analysis . . ..
[Under Bearden, the Court] inspects the character and intensity of the
individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification
for its exaction, on the other.
M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (citation omitted).
99. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566. The Court never explicitly asserted that the
parent-child relationship, as a fundamental liberty interest, requires heightened scruti-
ny. However, this could be inferred from the Court's language. The Court stated:
In aligning M.L.B.'s case and Mayer-parental status termination decrees
and criminal convictions that carry no jail time-for appeal access pur-
poses, we do not question the general rule ... that fee requirements
ordinarily are examined only for rationality .... The State's need for
revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the rationality
requirement .... But our cases solidly establish . . . two exceptions to
that general rule .... [Aiccess to judicial processes in cases criminal or
"quasi criminal in nature," [may not] turn on ability to pay.... [We
place decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases
which the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice."
Id. at 567-568. (citations omitted) Thus, the Court seems to place decrees terminating
parental status into some sort of heightened scrutiny category which is greater than
the rationality standard appropriate for the "mine run of cases" under an equal pro-
tection analysis. Perhaps the confusion can be explained by the fact that the Court's
analysis is not singularly one of equal protection. It also involves a due process anal-
ysis. Thus, this category of cases does not fit into the traditional tests of "rational
basis" or "strict scrutiny" analysis. It is clear, however, that some form of heightened
scrutiny will be applied in these cases.
100. See id.
Although the termination proceeding in this case was initiated by private
parties as a prelude to an adoption petition, rather than by a state agen-
cy, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B. re-
sists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other
than the State can, her parent-child relationship.
Id. at 564 n.8.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, argued that M.L.B. was afforded due process
when she had her day in the Mississippi Chancery Court. See id. at 572 (Thomas, J.
dissenting). He then rejected the equal protection analysis as being no longer viable.
See id. at 572-73.
101. See id. at 566; see also Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665-66.
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Court has long required when a family association so undeni-
ably important is at stake.""2
Mayer established that the Griffin principle may be applied
to appeals of petty offenses where imprisonment is not threat-
ened.'0 3 The impact of a conviction, even a misdemeanor con-
viction, may be of such severity to a litigant that the need for
unimpeded access to appellate procedures outweighs a state's
fiscal interests."° As in Mayer M.L.B. faced a severe impact
while the state's fiscal interest was minimal.0 5 Therefore, the
Griffin principle should be extended to civil litigation where the
stakes involve the loss of a commanding, fundamental liberty
interest, despite the civil or criminal nature of the case."
Like the unreasonable felony-nonfelony distinctions illustrated
in Mayer that impeded access to appeals in criminal cases
where a sufficiently high liberty interest was at stake, the crim-
inal-civil distinction is also unreasonable when a state proceed-
ing has terminated a fundamental, commanding liberty interest
of an indigent.0 7 Since parental status termination cases re-
102. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564.
103. See id. at 566. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas stated that Mayer
was questionable when it was decided and should be limited to the facts if not over-
ruled. See id. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 566.
105. See id. at 567.
106. The Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), held that "the extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the
extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss." Id. at 262-63 (quoting
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)). In Lassiter, the Court held that an examination of its precedents led
to the conclusion that the right to counsel is directly related to the "liberty" interest
involved. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981). As a
result, when a criminal defendant is sentenced to prison, she has an absolute right to
counsel. This is not based on a criminal defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but rather it is based upon those liberty interests pro-
tected by due process. As the liberty interest decreases, so does the right to counsel.
See id. at 26.
107. Justice Ginsburg cited Lassiter for the proposition that a parent's desire for
and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of her children
should receive deference and protection unless there is some powerful countervailing
interest, See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564. She went on to state that: "[t]he object of the
proceeding is 'not simply to infringe upon [the parent's] interest,' . . . 'but to end it;'
thus, a decision against 'a parent 'works a unique kind of deprivation.' For that rea-
son, [a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision . . . is . . . a
commanding one.'" Id. at 564-65 (citations omitted).
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sult in few appeals in Mississippi, there is not likely to be an
undue burden imposed on the state.' 8
Justice Ginsburg then aligned M.L.B. with Mayer for appeal
access purposes. She noted the general rule that fee require-
ments are examined only for rationality 9 and that exceptions
are made in cases criminal or quasi-criminal in nature."' In
108. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566-67 (1996) (citing Br. for Pet'r 20, 25) (observing
that only sixteen reported appeals in Mississippi from 1980 until 1996 referred to the
State's termination statute, and only twelve of those decisions addressed the merits of
the grant or denial of parental rights). The stakes for M.L.B. were sufficiently high
because of the "irretrievably destructive" impact on the family relationship and the
considerable risk of error. See id. at 567 (citing Br. for Resp't 28). Of the 63,765 civil
actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Courts in 1995, 194 involved termination of
parental rights. Of those cases decided on appeal in Mississippi in 1995 (including
court of appeals and supreme court cases), 492 were first appeals of criminal convic-
tions, sixty-seven involved domestic relations, sixteen involved child custody. See id.
If costs blocking access to parental rights termination appeals are removed,
however, it would seem that the number of these appeals would increase in Missis-
sippi. Justice Ginsburg attempted to dissuade such a theory based on the fact that
misdemeanor appeals in Mississippi remained low even after the Mayer decision. See
id.
Assuming that there are more misdemeanor convictions in Mississippi than
there are parental rights termination cases, the limited effect of the Mayer decision
in Mississippi indicates that M.L.B. will result in a proportionately lower strain on
Mississippi's judicial resources. For example, 298 first criminal appeals were taken in
Mississippi in 1995, seven of which were misdemeanors. See id. Mayer was decided in
1971, so these cases represent the current effect of the Mayer decision in Mississippi.
Between 1980 and 1996, there were only sixteen reported appeals referring to the
termination statute. See id. And, even if 194 cases had been filed with the Chancery
Court, this number is still less than the 492 first appeal criminal convictions. Thus,
the Court reasoned, the impact of M.L.B. would not be as great as the impact of
Mayer. See id.
There are problems with this reasoning. First, the number of misdemeanor
appeals in Mississippi before the Mayer decision is not known. Thus, one cannot
really know the effect of that decision in Mississippi. Also, since Justice Ginsburg did
not mention a statute, we must presume that Mississippi was affected by the Mayer
decision-that is, Mississippi had a statute that blocked appellate access for indigents
convicted of misdemeanors. Otherwise, this comparison seems to lack merit. Finally,
the reasoning does not mention why the number of appeals would not increase once
the barriers blocking access to appeals are removed. While misdemeanors may not be
worth the time, effort, and expense (though this is probably not a notable criteria for
indigents) that is necessary to appeal a conviction, the severity of a court decree
terminating one's parental rights may carry greater weight to a parent. Thus, even if
there were only 194 cases involving termination of parental rights at the Chancery
Court level, if all of these were decided in favor of termination, and all were ap-
pealed, judicial economy would not be served.
109. See M.L.B. 117 S. Ct. at 567; see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973) (clarifying that a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases
is the exception, not the rule).
110. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567 (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196
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such cases, access to judicial processes may not turn on ability
to pay because the potential severity of an adverse decision
demands equal access to the courts.
Parental status terminations can be as severe as cases crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal in nature. In his dissent in Lassiter, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated:
A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevoca-
ble. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent
with no right to visit or communicate with the child, to par-
ticipate in, or even to know about, any important decision
affecting the child's religious, educational, emotional, or
physical development. It is hardly surprising that this
forced dissolution of the parent-child relationship has been
recognized as a punitive sanction by courts, Congress, and
commentators.'
Thus, a state may not "bolt the door on equal justice""' in
termination of parental rights cases because the "substance and
sense" of the Court's decisions in Lassiter and Santosky indicate
the stakes are sufficiently high for the parent and that these
cases should be treated as if they were criminal or quasi-
criminal in nature."' Presumably, the "substance and sense"
(1971)).
111. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
112. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568 (citation omitted). Lassiter established that if
M.L.B.'s defense was sufficiently complex, she would have been designated state-paid
counsel. If the Court held that M.L.B. could be eligible for state-paid counsel but
should be flatly denied a transcript, it would be anomalous that one has a right to a
transcript if appealing a misdemeanor, although that person may be flatly denied
trial counsel regardless of the complexity of the misdemeanor defense. See id. at 567.
113. Justice Ginsburg summarily dismissed cases relied upon by the respondents
because the complainants in those cases sought aid to subsidize their privately initi-
ated action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances
that existed apart from state action. See id. at 568; see also Lyng v. United Auto
Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 363 n.2, 370-374 (1988) (rejecting an equal protection attack
on an amendment to the Food Stamp Act providing that no household could become
eligible for benefits while a household member was on strike); Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543-544, 550-551 (1983) (rejecting a nonprofit
organization's claim of free speech and equal protection rights to receive tax deduct-
ible contributions to support its lobbying activity); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
321-326 (1980) (holding that Medicaid funding need not be provided for women
seeking medically necessary abortions). M.L.B.'s complaint, said Justice Ginsburg, was
of a different order because she was trying to defend against Mississippi's destruction
of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with being ruled an unfit
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to which Justice Ginsburg referred is the idea that a parent's
relationship with her child is a fundamental liberty interest of
the parent in the same way that liberty from imprisonment is
of fundamental importance to the alleged criminal. 4
Justice Ginsburg concluded by rationalizing a limited applica-
tion of this newly expanded "equal justice" principal to civil
appeals. She explained that Lassiter and Santosky have not
served as precedent for cases in "other areas" and this indicates
that M.L.B. will not lead to a broad application of the Griffin
principle to civil appeals."5
B. Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas was not convinced that the newly found con-
stitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals would be re-
stricted to parental status termination cases."' He refuted the
logic of converging due process and equal protection to form a
right that neither alone supports."7
According to Justice Thomas, M.L.B. was given a meaningful
hearing, with counsel, and was, thus, afforded due process."'
He discredited the majority's reliance on Boddie in support of
M.L.B.'s due process claim. In Boddie, the indigents were de-
nied a fundamental right without a hearing. Thus, they were
denied due process."' In M.L.B., the mother was afforded pro-
parent by a court. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568. She then said that the idea that a
law may be unconstitutional simply because of a disproportionate impact is not how
the Court has interpreted Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), as applied to
M.L.B. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 569.
114. See supra note 99.
115. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
116. See id. at 570 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 571.
118. See id. at 572 ("Due process has never compelled an appeal where, as here,
its rigors are satisfied by an adequate hearing.").
119. See id. at 572.
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cedural protections beyond what is required in parental termi-
nation cases. 2 ' Accordingly, Justice Thomas felt that she was
afforded due process.
Justice Thomas also cited Washington v. Davis.' as stand-
ing for the proposition that equal protection only protects some-
one from purposeful discrimination and that disparate impact
alone does not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment has been
violated.'22 He then distinguished Williams v. Illinois" from
M.L.B. According to Justice Thomas, the majority relied on
Williams to support the idea that a law nondiscriminatory on
its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation because
that law applies only to one group and does not reach beyond
that class." Justice Thomas proposed that disparate impact
alone cannot be sufficient to violate equal protection, even when
that impact is against racial minorities or poor people."
Although M.L.B. was resisting the state's "devastating ad-
verse action," she, much like a criminal defendant, was not
entitled to post-trial process.'26 Her desire to have the state
subsidize her privately initiated appeal, a procedure not even
required under due process, was without merit according to
Justice Thomas. 7 He saw no difference between a facially
neutral law that serves in some cases to prevent people from
obtaining state employment, a state-funded education, or a
state-funded abortion and a facially neutral law that prevents a
120. See id. M.L.B. received both notice and a hearing before a neutral, legally
trained decision maker. She was represented by counsel, even though Lassiter does
not require such representation in every case. Her attorney could confront witnesses
and evidence against her. Also, the parental unfitness had to be proven by the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence. See id.
121. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Davis involved a verbal skill test administered to pro-
spective government employees. Four times as many black applicants failed the test
than did white applicants. See id. at 237. However, successful as well as unsuccessful
test-takers included members of both races. The Court held that disproportionate
impact alone was not enough to prove unconstitutional race discrimination. See id. at
248.
122. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
124. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 569 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 573-74 (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 248); see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 n.6 (1980).




person from taking an appeal." In both situations, a state
may, but is not required to, provide them."
Justice Thomas found the Mississippi law facially neutral
because it created no classification. 3 ° He felt that this case
was simply one of disparate impact on indigents and, that
alone, was not enough to assert a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The fundamental right of a parental relationship
was too attenuated from the Mississippi law because the fee
that M.L.B. was unable to pay did not prevent the exercise of
this fundamental right directly.'3 ' Since there was no violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, nor a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, Justice Thomas felt an amalgamation of the two
simply could not support M.L.B.'s claim.
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Thomas said that if
the case presented the question the majority construes, he
would overrule Griffin. According to Justice Thomas, the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal cases is grounded in consti-
tutional jurisprudence and should remain intact.'32 Even when
dealing with fundamental rights issues in a civil context, the
Court has not afforded the same protections to civil litigants as
it has to criminal litigants. For example, the Court did not find
a per se right to counsel for parental rights termination pro-
ceedings." In addition, the standard of proof is "clear and
convincing" evidence, a standard lower than the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard needed to find a criminal guilty."M
While Mayer provided an avenue to extend Griffin to paren-
tal rights termination cases, Justice Thomas believed that
128. See id. at 574.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 575.
131. See id. at 574 n.1. Justice Thomas cited Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where the Court struck down a poll tax that directly
restricted the exercise of a right found in that case to be fundamental-the right to
vote in state elections. Justice Thomas felt that the fee required by the Mississippi
law to appeal the Chancery Court's decision did not affect the fundamental right of
parental relationships. Rather, it affected a right to appeal, which has never been
found to be fundamental. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 574 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 575.
133. See id. (citing Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32
(1981)).
134. See id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982)).
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Mayer was an unjustified extension of Griffin and should be
limited to its facts, if not overruled.'35 His fear was that, un-
der the majority's rationale, anyone with an interest arguably
as important as the interest in Mayer could not be denied a
transcript in a civil appeal."'
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF M.L.B.
There are several possible effects of this decision. First, as
Justice Thomas notes, this decision may result in greater de-
mands on states to provide free assistance to would-be appel-
lants in civil cases involving interests that cannot be distin-
guished from the important interest at issue in M.L.B.'37 If an
interest that appears to be as fundamental as the interest of a
convicted misdemeanant is all that is needed to get a free tran-
script, several kinds of civil suits could arguably be brought."
Justice Thomas enunciated several examples of potential exten-
sions of this principle, such as extending the right to a free
transcript: to an indigent seeking to appeal the outcome of a
paternity suit;'39 to those who wish to appeal custody determi-
nations; 4 ° to persons against whom divorce decrees are en-
tered;'-' or in foreclosure actions seeking to oust persons from
their homes of many years.'
135. See id. at 576; ef. McGoogan, supra note 11, at 622 (arguing that Mayer indi-
cated a shift in the Court's policy limiting extension of Griffin).
136. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. See id. (arguing that the fact that Lassiter and Santosky have not been used
as precedent for other areas of law "gives little comfort").
138. See id. at 576.
139. In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires states to provide a free blood grouping test to an indigent defendant
in a paternity action. See id. at 17. The Court observed that the issue there was the
creation of a parent-child relationship. See id. at 13. Little's description of the interest
at stake in a paternity suit seems to place it on par with the interest in M.L.B. Both
cases involved the fundamental interest in a parent-child relationship.
140. See, e.g., Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that father's "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of
his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree and Ne-
braska law").
141. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court referred to a divorce
as the "adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id. at 382-83.
142. Most of these examples might be as important as the interest in Mayer, but
it is difficult to say that they are as important as the one in M.L.B. The Court has
made clear that extension of the Griffin principle to civil cases is to be limited to
M.L.B. V. S.L.J.
However, pertinent to the Court's analysis is the presence of
a commanding, fundamental liberty interest. While, generally,
such interests include freedom of choice in family matters, more
is needed to trigger the right to a free transcript. For example,
by distinguishing the state's imposition of the legal obligations
of a biological relationship between parent and child from the
state's termination of a fully existing parent-child relationship,
the Court has declined to extend Santosky to paternity proceed-
ings.' In addition to claiming an intrusion on a commanding,
fundamental liberty interest, M.L.B. was resisting the imposi-
tion of an official decree extinguishing what no power other
than the state could extinguish.' 4 As most civil litigation does
not involve such a decree, it will be difficult to assert this right
in the "mine run of civil cases."" Therefore, Justice Ginsburg
is probably correct that the "floodgates" of litigation will not be
opened by this decision.
Another implication involves the legitimacy of establishing a
right by converging the Due Process Clause and Equal Protec-
tion Clause when neither alone will support that right. Justice
Thomas argued that a right should not be found this way.'46
Instead of explaining why, he discussed how neither afford the
right alone-a proposition already acknowledged by the majori-
parental termination proceedings. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 569-70. But if the Court
used Mayer to extend it to those cases, the same extension could occur in these other
noted examples. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 89-90 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting in part) ("[W]here the right is so flmdamental as the tenant's claim to his
home, the requirements of due process should be more embracing.").
143. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 578-579 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 749-50 (1982)). Rivera involved a mother's attempt to seek child support
from a putative father who denied paternity. See id. at 576. The Court held that due
process was satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence standard in paternity suits
that differed in significant respects from parental status termination proceedings,
which require a clear and convincing evidence standard. See id. at 577-82. Most state
legislatures applied a "preponderance of the evidence" standard in paternity cases,
while thirty-eight jurisdictions, at the time Santosky was decided, required a higher
standard of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights. See id. at 581.
144. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564 n.8 (1996).
145. See id. at 569 ("termination decrees wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation" (cita-
tion omitted) (alteration original)). It is troubling that the state has no control over
effecting the merits of the case, yet is still required to pay costs involved in the
proceeding. However, such an argument could be made in any civil proceeding and
the Court has clearly held that civil cases involving fundamental liberty interests will
not be distinguished from criminal cases. See id. at 569-70.
146. See id. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ty." Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin, noted this prob-
lem.'" Later, Justice Harlan distinguished between laws di-
rected at indigents and those having an adverse affect on
them.'49 In Justice Harlan's view, the "State may have a mor-
al obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not re-
quired by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever
others can afford."5 ' According to him, the Court should con-
sider whether a state's actions violate fundamental "fairness" by
using a procedural due process analysis. 5' "If there is a depri-
vation of life, liberty or property which is based on disputed
facts or issues, then the individual whose interests are affected
must be granted a fair procedure before a fair decision-mak-
er."52 Due process safeguards apply whenever the government
seeks to burden an individual in the exercise of fundamental
constitutional rights.'53 However, the Court continued to apply
a dual analysis, emphasizing each clause at different times."
147. See id. at 566.
148. See supra note 33. Justice Harlan warned that if courts began to lift economic
burdens imposed by the state on the exercise of privileges, indigents would be able to
challenge the payment of tuition at state universities or the cost of transcripts in
civil appeals. See Medine, supra note 33.
149. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from
discriminating between "rich" and "poor" as such in the formulation and
application of their laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest that
this provision prevents the State from adopting a law of general applica-
bility that may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich, or, on
the other hand, from making some effort to redress economic imbalances
while not eliminating them entirely.
Id. at 361. As examples of permissible laws, Harlan noted a state's constitutional
authority to impose a uniform sales tax or a standard fine for criminal violations. See
id.; see also Medine, supra note 33.
150. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 362.
151. See id. at 363.
152. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 30, § 13.8, at 553.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Douglas, 372 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In Ross, the Court refused to extend Douglas, displacing any
hopes for using the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for expanding the ability of
litigants to present their cases without regard to their financial condition. So long as
fundamental fairness is not violated, any differences between the rights of indigents
and those of the rest of society are not constitutionally suspect. See Ross, 417 U.S. at
611-16. When providing assistance to indigents, rights found under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause are no broader than those found under due process. As a result, indigent
defendants are guaranteed only "adequate," not equal, access to the judicial system.
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, due
process has allowed the Supreme Court to expand the right of indigents without
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Justification for the convergence can best be understood in
the context of parental termination decrees. The fundamental
constitutional right to privacy'55 includes freedom of choice in
marital and family decisions. 5 ' Therefore, a state seeking to
take a child away from its parents must give the parents a
hearing to determine their fitness to retain the child. The fun-
damental nature of the interest in family autonomy requires
the state to prove its allegation of parental unfitness by at least
clear and convincing evidence. 57 Due process does not entitle
an indigent parent to the services of state-paid counsel in such
cases.'58 While there is no right to appeal afforded under due
process guarantees, once such procedures are established by the
state, the equal protection guarantee insures that access will
not be impeded by unreasoned distinctions. M.L.B. indicates
relying on an equal protection basis for doing so. See Medine, supra note 33, at 302-
03.
Note that in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), Justice O'Connor offered
a different rationale for not prohibiting discrimination based upon indigence. See id.
at 665-72. The question in Bearden was the effect of a criminal defendant's failure to
pay a fine and make restitution while on probation. See id. at 665. According to
Justice O'Connor:
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of di-
rectly confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's
financial background can play in determining an appropriate sentence.
When the Court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a
defendant's level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather
than a classification. Since indigence in this context is a relative term
rather than a classification, fitting "the problem of this case into an
equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally
accomplished ... " The more appropriate question is whether consider-
ation of a defendant's financial background in setting or resetting a sen-
tence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.
Id. at 666 n.8 (citation omitted).
Responding to an argument that Griffin and Douglas were based solely on the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), noted that
the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause each trigger a distinct inquiry:
"Due Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with
the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated.
'Equal Protection! on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State
between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." Id. at
405. The Court concluded that both clauses support the Griffin and Douglas decisions.
See id. at 405.
155. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
157. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767-68 (1982).
158. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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that the Court will continue this analysis if needed to combat
what it finds to be unreasoned distinctions between those liti-
gants gaining access to judicial processes and those who are
denied such access when a fundamental liberty interest is at
stake.'59
A third implication of this decision involves the criminal-civil
distinction. Justice Thomas's chief concern about the Griffin
line of cases is compelling: "[i]f requiring payment for proce-
dures (e.g., appeals) that are not required is invidious discrimi-
nation no matter what sentence results, it is difficult to imag-
ine why it is not invidious discrimination no matter what re-
sults and no matter whether the procedures involve a criminal
or civil case.""s However, the criminal-civil distinction may
not be that troublesome. Most civil cases are between private
parties where there exist other means of resolution, such as
settlement. Parental rights termination cases are unique be-
cause they generally pit the parent against the state. 161 Thus,
it is unlikely that a right to free transcripts for appeals will be
readily extended to other civil proceedings.'62
159. This "equal justice" principle could also be viewed in terms of natural law or
substantive due process. As Lassiter established, the parent-child relationship is a
fundamental liberty interest. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. Substantive due process
provides that there are certain individual liberties that are so intrinsic to our exis-
tence that the state cannot interfere with them absent a compelling state interest. In
such cases, the Court will substitute its judgment on expediency for that of the legis-
lature because the context is that of a fimdamental liberty interest. See Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court refused to give the legislature
the ordinary amount of deference regarding the expediency of such laws. Because
these 'fimdamental liberty interests" have no textual support in the Constitution, the
Court eventually incorporated most of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment to secure the protection of these interests from state legislation. Howev-
er, a full discussion of substantive due process or incorporation theory is beyond the
scope of this Note.
160. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 576 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. In parental rights termination suits, the state can divest someone of their
fundamental liberty interest in a relationship with her child. See supra note 106. It
is important to note that M.L.B. was not purely between two private parties. The
state had to declare the parental status of the parties before it could proceed with
the adoption process. The children's father wanted his new wife to adopt the children.
To adopt the children, M.L.B.'s parental rights had to be terminated. Thus, the Mis-
sissippi Chancery Court had to first declare that M.L.B.'s parental rights had been
terminated and then that the children could be adopted by the father's new wife. See
M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561.
162. While Justice Thomas includes other examples that may be similar, he as-
sumes that extension of this principle would be wrong. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570-
M.L.B. V. S.L.J.
The majority justifies its extension of the Griffin principle to
parental rights termination cases by stating that the Court has
consistently set them apart from other "mine run civil actions,"
even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce,
paternity, and child custody."= Nevertheless, when comparing
the Court's ruling in Little v. Streater'" to that of Lassiter, it
is ironic that the Court grants, on due process grounds, an indi-
gent putative father's claim for state-paid blood grouping tests
in the interest of according him a meaningful opportunity to
disprove his paternity,'" but then rejects, on due process
grounds, an indigent mother's claim for state-paid legal assis-
tance when the state seeks to take her own child away. 66
This indicates a disparity between the requirements of due pro-
cess in paternity suits and in termination suits.'67
Pertinent to the M.L.B. rationale is Congress' recent passing
of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996 (OCRAA).c This Act reduced Legal Services
Corporation's (LSC) funding by thirty percent 6 . and imposed
new restrictions on how LSC funds may be used.7 ° One of
these restrictions prohibits use of LSC funding for challenging
welfare laws. In effect, this means only LSC clients may not
71. If the state is acting in a manner that would violate the litiganes rights if the
proceeding were labeled "criminal," it seems unfair to say that such wrongs will not
be recognized because the proceeding was "civil." See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commit-
ment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed," the juvenile has
a right to appointed counsel even though the proceedings may be styled "civil" and
not "criminal"); see generally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing
Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577
(1997); Flynn, supra note 61; Philip L Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of In-
carcerated Parents in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analy-
sis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757 (1991/1992); Govert, supra note 66.
163. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564-66 n.11.
164. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
165. See id.
166. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
167. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 577 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
169. OCRAA reduces LSC funding by $278 million in fiscal year 1996, a reduction
of $122 million from 1995. See id. tit. V; Constitutional Law-Congress Imposes New
Restrictions on Use of Funds By the Legal Services Corporation.-Omnibus Consolidat-
ed Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1346, 1351 (1997).
170. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
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challenge welfare laws. This seems to violate the equal protec-
tion guarantees enunciated in M.L.B. and has created a legally
disadvantaged status for clients who rely on LSC lawyers.'
Finally, M.L.B. presents some very serious problems with the
adversarial system as a means of resolving parental status
disputes. In this case, the mother's interests were protected.
The Court found that one has a per se right to appeal a paren-
tal status termination decree so long as the state has provided
an appellate system accessible by some. But how meaningful is
this right of access? Conceivably, one could be afforded an ap-
peal, but not have an attorney. Lassiter stands for the
proposition that the trial court decides on a case by case basis
whether an indigent defendant will be appointed an attorney. If
the court weighs the interests involved and decides not to ap-
point an attorney, yet the state has established an appellate
system for such cases, the defendant should be granted an
appeal following an adverse decision. However, that same de-
fendant could be denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard
at the appellate level, if such a hearing is without counsel."2
Since parental status termination decrees are the end of the
road in custody disputes, they do warrant court proceedings as
opposed to mediation or early neutral evaluations. Nevertheless,
the justification for the adversarial system lies in the romantic
notion of each party being represented by a champion who will
actually present the case in the light most favorable to his
client. Typically, these "champions" charge fees that are indica-
tive of their effectiveness in court. Thus, the effectiveness of
representation seems to correlate directly to the amount of
money a litigant has available to spend on a case. The Court
has recognized that the Due Process Clause does not require an
equalization of economic conditions.7 3 Judicial recognition of
this proposition merely underscores the fact that the amount of
money one has often affects the outcome of his day in court.
This idea seems to strain the ultimate objective of providing
justice for anyone who enters the courts to resolve disputes.
171. See id. (discussing OCRAA and its implications on M.L.B.).
172. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (citing Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) ("What the Constitution does require is 'an opportu-
nity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.").
173. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The interests involved in parental termination suits are very
serious-even fundamental. Perhaps what is needed is a less
costly and less formal process that will allow courts to remove
the economic advantages that exist for parents who can afford
expensive litigation, while the other party is without such
means.
One example of how states could cut costs in these proceed-
ings exists in the formalistic practice of requiring official tran-
scripts from the court reporter. Why should a litigant pay
$2,300 for a transcript when there are so many alternatives
that are available for a lot less money? Surely these hearings
could have been recorded on tape and typed out for less money
(even by M.L.B. herself) and, subsequently, checked by the
clerk for accuracy. The need for an official transcript produced
by the court reporter seems to have a harmful effect on indi-
gent litigants. In fact, the Court has, in the past, recognized
that alternatives may exist to official transcripts.1" In addi-
tion, technological advances may soon allow for word processing
equipment to take oral testimony and turn it into a document.
Another puzzling question exists: why does a transcript cost
$2,300 when an attorney appointed by the state usually does
not cost half as much?175 Is this a statement about the ex-
pense of transcripts or about the lack of appropriate funding by
the state for appointed attorneys? In any case, it seems a bit
odd that the transcript would cost so much more than what an
attorney would receive for trying the case.
174. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228-29 (1971).
175. See Dominic Perella, Court-Appointed Lawyers' Fees Causing Alarm, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 1997, at B6. This article cited a nationwide survey of the
American Bar Association. According to that study, Virginia provides fees of $60 an
hour for work in the courtroom and $40 an hour for work outside the courtroom. The
fees are capped at $575 for grave felony charges and $265 for felonies that carry less
than 20 years of prison time. Fees for misdemeanors range from $100 to $132. Vir-
ginia provides the lowest fees in the country. According to the study, Mississippi set
the limit at $1,000, but the limit can be waived when the court-appointed defenders
show that they have worked excessive hours or incurred high expenses. See id. It
seems that the more sensible approach is taken by seventeen other states, including
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and North Carolina, which set no limit. See id.
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:571
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court has converged a fundamental right recognized
under the Due Process Clause with an equal protection analy-
sis. While past decisions seemed to indicate a shift in the
Court's reliance on this dual principle, M.L.B. indicates the
dual principle will remain intact. Also, the Court has applied
the Griffin principle of "equal justice" to a civil appellate case.
This extension will be limited only to parental rights termina-
tion decrees. To extend this principle, a fundamental liberty
interest would have to be at stake because the Court focused on
the interests involved and not the semantic distinctions be-
tween procedures. If a state procedure impedes equal access to
its courts when this is the only means to challenge intrusions
on a fundamental liberty interest, be it civil or criminal in
nature, the Court must cast it down.
Jason T. Jacoby*
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